Three Features of an Overlapping Consensus

§ 1

Before beginning, I recall two main points about the idea of an overlapping consensus. The first is that we look for a consensus of reasonable (as opposed to unreasonable or irra­tional) comprehensive doctrines. The crucial fact is not the fact of pluralism as such, but of reasonable pluralism (l:6.2). This diversity political liberalism sees, as I have said, as the long-run result of the powers of human reason within an enduring back-ground of free institutions. The fact of reasonable pluralism is not an unfortunate condition of human life, as we might say of pluralism as such, allowing for doctrines that are not only irra­tional but mad and aggressive. ln framing a political conception of justice so it can gain an overlapping consensus, we are not bending it to existing unreason, but to the fact of reasonable pluralism, itself the outcome of the free exercise of free human reason under conditions of liberty.

For the second point about an overlapping consensus, recall that, at the end of l:1.3—4, I said that in a constitutional democ­racy the public conception of justice should be, so far as possible, presented as independent of comprehensive religious, philo­sophical, and moral doctrines. This meant that justice as fairness is to be understood at the first stage of its exposition as a free-standing view that expresses a political conception of justice. It does not provide a specific religious, metaphysical, or epistemo­logical doctrine beyond what is implied by the political concep­tion itself. As remarked in 1:2.2, the political conception is a module, an essential constituent part, that in different ways fits into and can be supported by various reasonable comprehensive doctrines that endure in the society regulated by it.

§ 2

There are at least four objections likely to be raised against the idea of social unity founded on an overlapping consensus on a political conception of justice. I begin with perhaps the most obvious of these, namely, that an overlapping consensus is a mere modus vivendi.

To fix ideas I shall use a model case of an overlapping consen­sus to indicate what is meant; and I shall return to this example from time to time. It contains three views: one affirms the politi­cal conception because its religious doctrine and account of free faith lead to a principle of toleration and underwrite the fun­damental liberties of a constitutional regime; while the second view affirms the political conception on the basis of a compre­hensive liberal moral doctrine such as those of Kant or Mill. The third, however, is not systematically unified: besides the political values formulated by a freestanding political conception of jus­tice, it includes a large family of nonpolitical values. It is a pluralist view, let us say, since each subpart of this family has its own account based on ideas drawn from within it, leaving all values to be balanced against one another, either in groups or singly, in particular kinds of cases.

ln this model case the religious doctrine and the liberalisms of Kant and Mill are taken to be general and comprehensive. The third view is only partially comprehensive but holds, with political liberalism, that under reasonably favorable conditions that make democracy possible, political values normally outweigh whatever nonpolitical values conflict with them. The previous views agree with the last in this respect and so all views lead to roughly the same political judgments and thus overlap on the political conception.

§ 3

To begin with the objection: some will think that even if an overlapping consensus were sufficiently stable, the idea of political unity founded on an overlapping consensus must still be rejected, since it abandons the hope of political community and settles instead for a public understanding that is at bottom a mere modus vivendi. To this objection, we say that the hope of political community must indeed be abandoned, if by such a commu­nity we mean a political society united in affirming the same comprehensive doctrine. This possibility is excluded by the fact of reasonable pluralism together with the rejection of the op­pressive use of the state power to overcome it. The substantive question concerns the significant features of such a consensus and how these features affect social concord and the moral quality of public life. I turn to why an overlapping consensus is not a mere modus vivendi.

A typical use of the phrase "modus vivendi" is to characterize a treaty between two states whose national aims and interests put them at odds. In negotiating a treaty each state would be wise and prudent to make sure that the agreement proposed repre­sents an equilibrium point: that is, that the terms and conditions of the treaty are drawn up in such a way that it is public knowl­edge that it is not advantageous for either state to violate it. The treaty will then be adhered to because doing so is regarded by each as in its national interest, including its interest in its reputa­tion as a state that honors treaties. But in general both states are ready to pursue their goals at the expense of the other, and should conditions change they may do so. This background high­lights the way in which such a treaty is a mere modus vivendi. A similar background is present when we think of social consensus founded on self- or group interests, or on the outcome of political bargaining: social unity is only apparent, as its stability is contingent on circumstances remaining such as not to upset the fortunate convergence of interests.

§ 4

That an overlapping consensus is quite different from a modus vivendi is clear from our model case. In that example, note two aspects: first, the object of consensus, the political conception of justice, is itself a moral conception. And second, it is affirmed on moral grounds, that is, it includes conceptions of society and of citizens as persons, as well as principles of justice, and an account of the political virtues through which those prin­ciples are embodied in human character and expressed in public life. An overlapping consensus, therefore, is not merely a con­sensus on accepting certain authorities, or on complying with certain institutional arrangements, founded on a convergence of self- or group interests. <font color="purple"All those who affirm the political concep­tion start from within their own comprehensive view and draw on the religious, philosophical, and moral grounds it provides. The fact that people affirm the same political conception on those grounds does not make their affirming it any less religious, philosophical, or moral, as the case may be, since the grounds sincerely held determine the nature of their affirmation.

Einerseits wird die Gesellschaft als ein Konglomerat unterschiedlicher Weltanschauungs-Systeme verstanden, andererseits werden diese Systeme selbst als intern differenziert aufgefasst. Nicht alle Bestandteile einer "reasonable comprehensive doctrine" funktionieren auf dieselbe Weise. Es ist möglich, Überzeugungen mit anderen Systemen zu teilen.

The preceding two aspects of an overlapping consensus — moral object and moral grounds — connect with a third aspect, that of stability. This means that those who affirm the various views supporting the political conception will not withdraw their support of it should the relative strength of their view in society increase and eventually become dominant. So long as the three views are affirmed and not revised, the political conception will still be supported regardless of shifts in the distribution of polit­ical power. Each view supports the political conception for its own sake, or on its own merits. The test for this is whether the consensus is stable with respect to changes in the distribution of power among views. This feature of stability highlights a basic contrast between an overlapping consensus and a modus vivendi, the stability of which does depend on happenstance and a balance of relative forces.

This becomes clear once we change our example and include the views of Catholics and Protestants in the sixteenth century. At that time there was not an overlapping consensus on the principle of toleration. Both faiths held that it was the duty of the ruler to uphold the true religion and to repress the spread of heresy and false doctrine. In such a case the acceptance of the principle of toleration would indeed be a mere modus vivendi, because if either faith becomes dominant, the principle of toler­ation would no longer be followed. Stability with respect to the distribution of power is lacking. So long as such views as those of Catholic and Protestant in the sixteenth century are very much in the minority, and are likely to remain so, they do not signifi­cantly affect the moral quality of public life and the basis of social concord. For the vast majority in society are confident that the distribution of power will range over and be widely shared by views in the consensus that affirm the political conception of ustice for its own sake. But should this situation change, the moral quality of political life will also change in ways that are obvious and require no comment.

§ 5

In conclusion I comment briefly on what we may call "the depth and breadth of an overlapping consensus" and the specific­ity of its focus; that is, how deep does the consensus go into citizens' comprehensive doctrines? How broad are the institu­tions to which it applies? And how specific is the conception agreed to?

The preceding account says that the consensus goes down to the fundamental ideas within which justice as fairness is worked out. It supposes agreement deep enough to reach such ideas as those of society as a fair system of cooperation and of citizens as reasonable and rational, and free and equal. As for its breadth, it covers the principles and values of a political conception (in this case those of justice as fairness) and it applies to the basic struc­ture as a whole. This degree of depth and breadth and specificity helps to fix ideas and keeps before us the main question: consis­tent with plausibly realistic assumptions, what is the deepest and widest feasible conception of political justice?

There are, of course, other possibilities. I have not supposed that an overlapping consensus on a political conception is neces­sary for certain kinds of social unity and stability. Rather I have said that, with two other conditions, it is sufficient for the most reasonable basis of social unity available to us (1:8.1). Yet as Baier has suggested, a less deep consensus on the principles and rules of a workable political constitution may be sufficient for less demanding purposes and far easier to obtain. He thinks that in fact in the United States we have actually achieved something like that. So rather than supposing that the consensus reaches down to a political conception covering principles for the whole of the basic structure, a consensus may cover only certain funda­mental procedural political principles for the constitution I return to these matters in §§6—7 when we discuss the steps from "constitutional consensus," as I shall call it, to overlapping con­sensus.

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