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BOOK II: Of Ideas, Chapter I

Of Ideas in general, and their Original

1. Idea is the object of thinking.

Every man being conscious to himself that he thinks; and that which his mind is applied about whilst thinking being the ideas that are there, it is past doubt that men have in their minds several ideas,- such as are those expressed by the words whiteness, hardness, sweetness, thinking, motion, man, elephant, army, drunkenness, and others: it is in the first place then to be inquired, How he comes by them?

Das begriffliche Instrumentarium für das Sprechen über "Ideen im Verstand" setzt sich aus folgenden Bestandteilen zusammen:
  • Bewusstsein: Menschen sind von Umweltreizen abhängig und sie verfügen über ein spezielles Feedback: sie können auf ihre Reaktionen reagieren. Ihre Ausrichtung auf die Umgebung kann durch eine Ausrichtung auf die Effekte dieser Umgebung auf diesen Organismus ergänzt werden.
  • Eine Ausprägung dieser Fähigkeit, sich nicht nur auf Sinnesreize, sondern auch auf die Wirkung zu beziehen, die sie auf den sinnlich verfassten Organismus ausüben, nennt sich Verstand.
  • Um "Verstand" zu erläutern, gebraucht man folgendes Vokabular:
  • der Verstand bezieht sich auf ("denkt an") etwas (er ist intentional verfasst)
  • als dieses etwas kommen in Frage: Weltumstände, Bewusstseinszustände. Sachverhalte und Ideen (Vorstellungen)
  • Ideen befinden sich (im Unterschied zur "Aussenwelt") im Verstand
Diese sprachlichen Vorgaben entstehen aus einem Vorverständnis und verfestigen das darin angelegte Bild. Sinne sind "nach aussen gerichtet", die Sinnesverarbeitung erfolgt innen. So wie die Sonne eine Pflanze wachsen läßt, der Wachstumsvorgang aber innerhalb der Pflanze vor sich geht. Der Ortsbestimmung "in" kommt entscheidende Bedeutung zu.
Zahlreiche Verwendungen von "in" lassen sich finden: "in der Tasche", "im 3. Stock", "in der gestrigen Besprechung", "in Erwartung des Regens", "im Gedächtnis an jemanden", "in meiner Wahrnehmenung", "in Anbetracht der gegebenen Umstände". Es fragt sich, welchen Sprachgebrauch man für den philosophischen Gebrauch präferiert.
Drei Zugangsweisen sind hervorzuheben:
  • die Einprägung in einem metaphysischen, kosmologischen oder theologischen Zusammenhang
  • der menschliche Verstand als "Spiegel der Natur"
  • Sprechen und Handeln als Ausgangspunkte philosophischer Überlegungen

I know it is a received doctrine, that men have native ideas, and original characters, stamped upon their minds in their very first being. This opinion I have at large examined already; and, I suppose what I have said in the foregoing Book will be much more easily admitted, when I have shown whence the understanding may get all the ideas it has; and by what ways and degrees they may come into the mind;- for which I shall appeal to every one's own observation and experience.

2. All ideas come from sensation or reflection.

Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas:- How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from EXPERIENCE. In that all our knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our observation employed either, about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking. These two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring.

"furnish": liefern, ausstatten, beibringen
  • "supply: give something useful or necessary to; "We provided the room with an electrical heater"
  • provide or equip with furniture; "We furnished the house in the Biedermeyer style"
  • Material used to create an engineered product; To provide a place with furniture, or other equipment; To supply or give
"store": Vorrat, Schatz, Reichtum, Lager
  • a supply of something available for future use; "he brought back a large store of Cuban cigars"
  • keep or lay aside for future use; "store grain for the winter"; "The bear stores fat for the period of hibernation when he doesn't eat"
  • shop: a mercantile establishment for the retail sale of goods or services; "he bought it at a shop on Cape Cod"

3. The objects of sensation one source of ideas.

First, our Senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them. And thus we come by those ideas we have of yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities; which when I say the senses convey into the mind, I mean, they from external objects convey into the mind what produces there those perceptions. This great source of most of the ideas we have, depending wholly upon our senses, and derived by them to the understanding, I call SENSATION.

4. The operations of our minds, the other source of them.

Secondly, the other fountain from which experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas is,- the perception of the operations of our own mind within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got;- which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas, which could not be had from things without. And such are perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the different actings of our own minds;- which we being conscious of, and observing in ourselves, do from these receive into our understandings as distinct ideas as we do from bodies affecting our senses. This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself; and though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense. But as I call the other SENSATION, so I Call this REFLECTION, the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself. By reflection then, in the following part of this discourse, I would be understood to mean, that notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of them, by reason whereof there come to be ideas of these operations in the understanding. These two, I say, viz. external material things, as the objects of SENSATION, and the operations of our own minds within, as the objects of REFLECTION, are to me the only originals from whence all our ideas take their beginnings. The term operations here I use in a large sense, as comprehending not barely the actions of the mind about its ideas, but some sort of passions arising sometimes from them, such as is the satisfaction or uneasiness arising from any thought.

5. All our ideas are of the one or the other of these.

The understanding seems to me not to have the least glimmering of any ideas which it doth not receive from one of these two. External objects furnish the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities, which are all those different perceptions they produce in us; and the mind furnishes the understanding with ideas of its own operations.

These, when we have taken a full survey of them, and their several modes, combinations, and relations, we shall find to contain all our whole stock of ideas; and that we have nothing in our minds which did not come in one of these two ways. Let any one examine his own thoughts, and thoroughly search into his understanding; and then let him tell me, whether all the original ideas he has there, are any other than of the objects of his senses, or of the operations of his mind, considered as objects of his reflection. And how great a mass of knowledge soever he imagines to be lodged there, he will, upon taking a strict view, see that he has not any idea in his mind but what one of these two have imprinted;- though perhaps, with infinite variety compounded and enlarged by the understanding, as we shall see hereafter.