An Overlapping Consensus not Indifferent or Skeptical
§ 1
I turn to a second objection to the idea of an overlapping consensus on a political conception of justice: namely, that the avoidance of general and comprehensive doctrines implies indifference or skepticism as to whether a political conception of justice can be true, as opposed to reasonable in the constructivist sense. This avoidance may appear to suggest that such a conception might be the most reasonable one for us even when it is known not to be true, as if truth were simply beside the point. In reply, it would be fatal to the idea of a political conception to see it as skeptical about, or indifferent to, truth, much less as in conflict with it. Such skepticism or indifference would put political philosophy in opposition to numerous comprehensive doctrines, and thus defeat from the outset its aim of achieving an overlapping consensus.
- Wir brauchen die Idee der Wahrheit, wenn wir die politische Auffassung von Gerechtigkeit vertreten wollen. Und damit ergibt sich eine Abhängigkeit von den globalen Weltauffassungen, die Wahrheit für sich beanspruchen.
We try, so far as we can, neither to assert nor to deny any particular comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral view, or its associated theory of truth and the status of values. Since we assume each citizen to affirm some such view, we hope to make it possible for all to accept the political conception as true or reasonable from the standpoint of their own comprehensive view, whatever it may be. Properly understood, then, a political conception of justice need be no more indifferent, say, to truth in philosophy and morals than the principle of toleration, suitably understood, need be indifferent to truth in religion. Since we seek an agreed basis of public justification in matters of justice, and since no political agreement on those disputed questions can reasonably be expected, we turn instead to the fundamental ideas we seem to share through the public political culture. From these ideas we try to work out a political conception reflection. Once this is done, citizens may within their comprehensive doctrines regard the political conception of justice as true, or as reasonable, whatever their view allows.
- Es besteht de facto Einigkeit über verschiedene Punkte: den Wert des menschlichen Lebens, Gewissensfreiheit, Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz. Dafür kann unterschiedlich argumentiert werden, die Frage ist, wie abtrennbar von den Argumentationsweisen die Resultate sind. Die liberale Gesellschaft induziert einen Bruch in den holistischen Zusammenhängen.
§ 2
Some may not be satisfied with this; they may reply that, despite these protests, a political conception of justice must express indifference or skepticism. Otherwise it could not lay aside fundamental religious, philosophical, and moral questions because they are politically difficult to settle, or may prove intractable. Certain truths, it may be said, concern things so important that differences about them have to be fought out, even should this mean civil war. To this we say first that questions are not removed from the political agenda, so to speak, solely because they are a source of conflict. We appeal instead to a political conception of justice to distinguish between those questions that can be reasonably removed from the political agenda and those that cannot. Some questions still on the agenda will be controversial, at least to some degree; this is normal with political issues.
To illustrate: from within a political conception of justice let us suppose we can account both for equal liberty of conscience, which takes the truths of religion off the political agenda, and the equal political and civil liberties, which by ruling out serfdom and slavery take the possibility of those institutions off the agenda. But controversial issues inevitably remain: for example, how more exactly to draw the boundaries of the basic liberties when they conflict (where to set "the wall between church and state"); how to interpret the requirements of distributive justice even when there is considerable agreement on general principles for the basic structure; and finally, questions of policy such as the use of nuclear weapons. These cannot be removed from politics. But by avoiding comprehensive doctrines we try to bypass religion and philosophy's profoundest controversies so as to have some hope of uncovering a basis of a stable overlapping consensus.
§ 3
Nevertheless, in affirming a political conception of justice we may eventually have to assert at least certain aspects of our own comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrine (by no means necessarily fully comprehensive). This will happen whenever someone insists, for example, that certain questions are so fundamental that to insure their being rightly settled justifies civil strife. The religious salvation of those holding a particular religion, or indeed the salvation of a whole people, may be said to depend on it. At this point we may have no alternative but to deny this, or to imply its denial and hence to maintain the kind of thing we had hoped to avoid.
To consider this, imagine rationalist believers who contend that these beliefs are open to and can be fully established by reason (uncommon though this view may be). In this case the believers simply deny what we have called "the fact of reasonable pluralism." So we say of the rationalist believers that they are mistaken in denying that fact; but we need not say that their religious beliefs are not true, since to deny that religious beliefs can be publicly and fully established by reason is not to say that they are not true. Of course, we do not believe the doctrine believers here assert, and this is shown in what we do. Even if we do not, say, hold some form of the doctrine of free religious faith that supports equal liberty of conscience, our actions nevertheless imply that we believe the concern for salvation does not require anything incompatible with that liberty. Still, we do not put forward more of our comprehensive view than we think needed or useful for the political aim of consensus.
- Eine schwierige Unterscheidung zwischen öffentlich und vernünftig einsichtig zu machen und wahr. Rawls untersucht den Wahrheitsbegriff nicht näher und berücksichtigt darum nicht, dass dieser selbst (siehe Davidson) auf einer Vernunftzuschreibung beruht. Sofern es der Wahrheitsanspruch einer "reasonable comprehensive doctrine" ist, kann er nicht ausserhalb solcher Verfahren liegen. Dann entsteht allerdings das Problem, dass die Wahrheit nicht so weit von der Vernünftigkeit entfernt werden kann.
§ 4
The reason for this restraint is to respect, as best we can, the limits of public reason (discussed in VI). Let us suppose that by respecting these limits we succeed in reaching an overlapping consensus on a conception of political justice. It will then be, for the moment at least, reasonable. Some might insist that reaching this reflective agreement is itself sufficient grounds for regarding that conception as true, or at any rate highly probable. But we refrain from this further step: it is unnecessary and may interfere with the practical aim of finding an agreed public basis of justification. For many the true, or the religiously and the metaphysically well-grounded, goes beyond the reasonable. The idea of an overlapping consensus leaves this step to be taken by citizens individually in line with their own comprehensive views. Were justice as fairness to make an overlapping consensus possible it would complete and extend the movement of thought that began three centuries ago with the gradual acceptance of the principle of toleration and led to the nonconfessional state and equal liberty of conscience. This extension is required for an agreement on a political conception of justice given the historical and social circumstances of a democratic society. To apply the principles of toleration to philosophy itself is to leave to citizens themselves to settle the questions of religion, philosophy, and morals in accordance with views they freely affirm.
- Wahrheit jenseits der Vernunft! Im Grenzfall wird den ganzheitlichen Überzeugungssystemen eine Wahrheit zugestanden, die vernünftig nicht zu begründen ist. Und die verbleibende Vernunft ist darum nicht skeptisch, weil sie sich zu diesem Punkt gar nicht äußert. Das ist ein hoher Preis für die Vermeidung des Skeptizismus.
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