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=== Raufereien, Totschlag  ===  
 
=== Raufereien, Totschlag  ===  
  
In body-to-body fighting, the fighter sees the eyes and
+
In body-to-body fighting, the fighter sees the eyes and body of his opponent, and has body contact with him. He smells him, feels him, hears him. The fighters see, smell, and feel the skin, the bodily movements, the breathing, the sweat, and perhaps the blood of their opponent. During the fight they are frequently and literally in touch. This has epistemic and moral consequences.  
body of his opponent, and has body contact with him. He
+
 
smells him, feels him, hears him. The fighters see, smell,
+
The fighter knows that his opponent is also a person and a human being, who also struggles to win, who has feelings (e.g. hate), and who also feels pain when he is hit. The fighter is also very aware of his own body; in a sense his body is his weapon, the fighter ‘is’ weapon and agent at the same time. Moreover, he
and feel the skin, the bodily movements, the breathing, the
+
receives immediate feedback from his opponent, everything he does meets concrete, physical resistance. He also feels everything the opponent does. He is totally involved in the fight. He is immersed in it, is highly concentrated. In his experience there is no mind separated from a body.  
sweat, and perhaps the blood of their opponent. During the
+
 
fight they are frequently and literally in touch. This has
+
In the experience of what Csikszentmihalyi calls ‘flow’, the fighter is one. He does not and cannot take (reflective) distance or distance himself from his opponent. The fighters are ‘condemned’ to one another. Furthermore, the fight is a personal matter: he fights with a particular person, not with an ‘enemy’. He knows his opponent or, if not, he gets to know the person during the fight in various ways. During the fight the fighters also share the same physical, geographical space, <font color="purple">for example a bar or a street corner</font>. Perhaps they even live in the same place (village, city) and share the same social background and culture.
epistemic and moral consequences. The fighter knows that
 
his opponent is also a person and a human being, who also
 
struggles to win, who has feelings (e.g. hate), and who also
 
feels pain when he is hit. The fighter is also very aware of
 
his own body; in a sense his body is his weapon, the fighter
 
‘is’ weapon and agent at the same time. Moreover, he
 
receives immediate feedback from his opponent, everything he does meets concrete, physical resistance. He also
 
feels everything the opponent does. He is totally involved
 
in the fight. He is immersed in it, is highly concentrated. In
 
his experience there is no mind separated from a body. In
 
the experience of what Csikszentmihalyi calls ‘flow’, the
 
fighter is one. He does not and cannot take (reflective)
 
distance or distance himself from his opponent. The
 
fighters are ‘condemned’ to one another. Furthermore, the
 
fight is a personal matter: he fights with a particular person,
 
not with an ‘enemy’. He knows his opponent or, if not, he
 
gets to know the person during the fight in various ways.
 
During the fight the fighters also share the same physical,
 
geographical space, for example a bar or a street corner.
 
Perhaps they even live in the same place (village, city) and
 
share the same social background and culture.
 
  
 
=== Töten aus Distanz ===
 
=== Töten aus Distanz ===
  
Drone bombing and, more generally remote controlled
+
Drone bombing and, more generally remote controlled military robots, then appears to be the ultimate military distancing technology. The fighter’s own vulnerability is close to zero (or so it seems) and those he is ordered to kill appear as remote targets. The separation between fighter and opponent is complete. <font color="purple">Drones seem to be illustrative of a move towards a kind of ‘final’ stage in the history of military technology understood as a history of distancing technology, in which the distance between fighter and ‘the ground’ is maximized</font>. If there is a next step, it is fighting and killing from space—a step which I believe has already been taken.
military robots, then appears to be the ultimate military
 
distancing technology. The fighter’s own vulnerability is
 
close to zero (or so it seems) and those he is ordered to kill
 
appear as remote targets. The separation between fighter
 
and opponent is complete. Drones seem to be illustrative of
 
a move towards a kind of ‘final’ stage in the history of
 
military technology understood as a history of distancing
 
technology, in which the distance between fighter and ‘the
 
ground’ is maximized. If there is a next step, it is fighting
 
and killing from space—a step which I believe has already
 
been taken.
 
  
It seems that in the history of military technology there
+
It seems that in the history of military technology there is a kind of distancing arms race: the opponent will (also) develop offensive and defensive technologies that create distance, and the race is about who can create a fighting position that is most distant in order to decrease one’s own vulnerability (defensive reason); yet at the same time the technology needs to be ‘bridging’ enough to enable killing of the distant target (offensive reason). Drones seem to do
is a kind of distancing arms race: the opponent will (also)
 
develop offensive and defensive technologies that create
 
distance, and the race is about who can create a fighting
 
position that is most distant in order to decrease one’s own
 
vulnerability (defensive reason); yet at the same time the
 
technology needs to be ‘bridging’ enough to enable killing
 
of the distant target (offensive reason). Drones seem to do
 
 
that job perfectly.
 
that job perfectly.
  
 
...
 
...
  
Indeed, there seems to be something cowardly and unfair
+
Indeed, <font color="purple">there seems to be something cowardly and unfair about remote killing</font>. The problem with regard to fairness in the case of drones is not only or not so much the unequal power of the parties on the ‘attack’ side (e.g. missile vs. gun), but the unequal vulnerability on the ‘defence’ side.
about remote killing. The problem with regard to fairness in
+
 
the case of drones is not only or not so much the unequal
+
The first party does not commit his life to the fight, does not risk his life; nothing is at stake for the drone fighter — at least not in terms of human lives (the vehicle is still vulnerable, of course, and its loss is regarded by the military as substantial).  
power of the parties on the ‘attack’ side (e.g. missile vs.
+
 
gun), but the unequal vulnerability on the ‘defence’ side.
+
This asymmetry may be regarded as unfair, and in terms of virtue and vice the drone fighter could be called ‘cowardly’. On the other hand, he and those who order him to kill also carry a huge responsibility, somewhat comparable to an invulnerable, all-powerful, and all-knowing god who selects the weeds and removes them —here by, literally, descending from heaven to earth and strike the poor earthlings. Who can carry that kind of responsibility?
The first party does not commit his life to the fight, does not
+
 
risk his life; nothing is at stake for the drone fighter—at least
+
::Die Asymmetrie besteht darin, dass Menschen wehrlos einer Tötungsmaschine ausgesetzt sind. Sie wird nach Coeckelberg dadurch relativiert, dass die Tötenden eine riesige, gottähnliche Verantwortung tragen. In der Tat: Wer kann eine solche Verantwortung übernehmen? Aber vor allem: <font color="purple">Inwiefern mildert es die Asymmetrie, wenn er die Verantwortung dafür übernimmt, Menschen ohne die Möglichkeit zur Gegenwehr zu töten?</font>  --[[Benutzer:Anna|anna]] ([[Benutzer Diskussion:Anna|Diskussion]]) 11:03, 2. Jun. 2016 (CEST)
not in terms of human lives (the vehicle is still vulnerable, of
+
 
course, and its loss is regarded by the military as substantial).
+
However, this picture of the practice as necessarily implying a huge moral distance ... is not entirely correct and fair. Drone fighting is rather different from artillery fighting and certainly different from discharging ‘some random bullet’, as Don Quixote describes the artillery of his day.  
This asymmetry may be regarded as unfair, and in terms of
 
virtue and vice the drone fighter could be called ‘cowardly’.
 
On the other hand, he and those who order him to kill also
 
carry a huge responsibility, somewhat comparable to an
 
invulnerable, all-powerful, and all-knowing god who selects
 
the weeds and removes them3—here by, literally, descending from heaven to earth and strike the poor earthlings. Who
 
can carry that kind of responsibility?
 
However, this picture of the practice as necessarily
 
implying a huge moral distance as suggested by Cervantes
 
(and by Sharkey) is not entirely correct and fair. Drone
 
fighting is rather different from artillery fighting and certainly different from discharging ‘some random bullet’, as
 
Don Quixote describes the artillery of his day. Let me first
 
clarify the role of information technology in drone fighting
 
in order to further explain what could be morally problematic about drone fighting, and then nuance and revise
 
the thesis about drones and moral distance.
 
  
  
 
=== Menschen als Zielscheiben ===
 
=== Menschen als Zielscheiben ===
  
This social-epistemic and techno-epistemic operation
+
Thus, I wish to add a Heideggerian hermeneutical point in addition to the empirical-psychological one already acknowledged in the literature. The empirical-psychological version of the thesis assumes that there is a human opponent which we perceive in a morally neutral, objective way and which then can or cannot receive our sympathy, depending on the distance created by the technology. The Heideggerian assumption I start from is that there is no neutral way of conceiving of the opponent, that the opponent already appears to us as a target because of the technology, as a standing-to-be-killed. .... <font color="purple">The technology and the distance it creates does not only produce a barrier between our empathic capacity and the opponent, it changes the very way we perceive that opponent</font>. In this sense, the technology creates a different world for the fighter. This has moral consequences.  
should not be understood in ‘psychological’ terms alone.
 
The technology does not just switch on or off a particular
 
‘faculty’ (sympathy or empathy) or brain regions (those
 
regions of the brain that are active when we sympathize); it
 
also changes the way we think and act. Thus, I wish to add
 
a Heideggerian hermeneutical point in addition to the
 
empirical-psychological one already acknowledged in the
 
literature. The empirical-psychological version of the thesis
 
assumes that there is a human opponent which we perceive
 
in a morally neutral, objective way and which then can or
 
cannot receive our sympathy, depending on the distance
 
created by the technology. The Heideggerian assumption I
 
start from is that there is no neutral way of conceiving of
 
the opponent, that the opponent already appears to us as a
 
target because of the technology, as a standing-to-be-killed
 
(in analogy with Heidegger’s term ‘standing-reserve’, see
 
Heidegger 1977). The technology and the distance it creates does not only produce a barrier between our empathic
 
capacity and the opponent, it changes the very way we
 
perceive that opponent. In this sense, the technology creates a different world for the fighter. This has moral consequences. Let me further develop (and then nuance) the
 
Heideggerian argument.
 
The thesis about distance, technology and morality is
 
not only supported by Levinas but is also in line with
 
Heideggerian thinking in philosophy of technology. In
 
particular, the work of Dreyfus and Borgmann suggests
 
that electronic technologies are morally problematic
 
because they do not promote engagement and commitment.
 
For example, Dreyfus has shown that the internet can be
 
interpreted as means to leave your body behind and
 
become invulnerable, and that teletechnologies jeopardise
 
real commitment (Dreyfus 2001). And Borgmann has
 
argued that technological devices make goods available
 
without requiring much engagement and skill (Borgmann
 
1984). This point seems also applicable to electronic
 
technologies: they make life all too easy in the sense that
 
they do not ask us to directly and bodily engage with our
 
material and physical environment. The distance de-skills
 
us: we become dependent on the technology and we do no
 
longer know how it works, what it does, and indeed what
 
we are doing. Moreover, according to Borgmann modern
 
technologies also threaten the social, communal life: when
 
the fireplace is replaced by the screen, we become removed
 
from one another. The moral distance between us and the
 
world, and between us and others, increases.
 
Applied to the case of electronic weapon technology,
 
this analysis of modern and contemporary information
 
technology would presumably imply that the fighters who
 
watch the screens work in a way that does not create a kind
 
of knowledge that is grounded in lived bodily experience,
 
in handling things on the ground, in skilfully engaging with
 
what happens on the battlefield and with others, and that
 
therefore we have a moral problem here since, because of
 
the new technological practice, the fighter cannot see the
 
face of the other and becomes both experientially and
 
morally disengaged from the world and detached from
 
others. This renders what we could call ‘screenfighting’
 
morally problematic. It seems that the killing is easier since
 
the practice appears to the pilots as a videogame: promoting an entirely detached view of the battlefield, it
 
suggests that you can kill as much as you want; your action
 
does not have real moral consequences. The ‘easier’ the
 
technology, the more moral and social distance it creates.
 
But is this an adequate analysis of the actual practice of
 
drone fighting?
 
  
=== Monitore: Spiegel der Moral ===
+
...
  
Furthermore, as social beings the members of the drone
+
In particular, the work of Dreyfus and Borgmann suggests that electronic technologies are morally problematic because they do not promote engagement and commitment.
crew are (still) part of a social environment and network at
+
 
the airbase and elsewhere (e.g. family and friends). They
+
... they (i.e. electronic devices, h.h.) make life all too easy in the sense that they do not ask us to directly and bodily engage with our material and physical environment. The distance de-skills us: we become dependent on the technology and we do no longer know how it works, what it does, and indeed what we are doing.  ... The moral distance between us and the world, and between us and others, increases.
may not literally see people and talk to people while flying
+
 
the plane, but their cognitive and moral way of dealing
+
Applied to the case of electronic weapon technology, this analysis of modern and contemporary information technology would presumably imply that the fighters who
with the world and with others is deeply shaped by the
+
watch the screens <font color="purple">work in a way that does not create a kind of knowledge that is grounded in lived bodily experience</font>, in handling things on the ground, in skilfully engaging with what happens on the battlefield and with others, and that therefore <font color="purple">we have a moral problem here since, because of the new technological practice, the fighter cannot see the face of the other</font> and becomes both experientially and morally disengaged from the world and detached from others.
forms of sociality of which they are part and ‘in’ which
+
 
they live. When they enter the airbase, they do not completely leave behind ‘home’. And the military and the
+
This renders what we could call ‘screenfighting’ morally problematic. It seems that the killing is easier since the practice appears to the pilots as a videogame: promoting an entirely detached view of the battlefield, it suggests that you can kill as much as you want; your action does not have real moral consequences. The ‘easier’ the technology, the more moral and social distance it creates.
practice of drone fighting have their own forms of sociality.
+
 
Thus, although one cannot deny the physical, social, and
+
But <font color="purple">is this an adequate analysis of the actual practice of drone fighting?</font>
moral distancing effects of the technological practice, as
+
 
embodied and social beings, drone pilots are likely to
+
=== Drohnensteuerung: Spiegel der Moral? ===
experience some empathetic bridging when they view their
+
 
targets and therefore do not that easily overcome their
+
Furthermore, as social beings the members of the drone crew are (still) part of a social environment and network at the airbase and elsewhere (e.g. family and friends). They may not literally see people and talk to people while flying the plane, but their cognitive and moral way of dealing with the world and with others is deeply shaped by the forms of sociality of which they are part and ‘in’ which they live. When they enter the airbase, they do not completely leave behind ‘home’. And <font color="purple">the military and the practice of drone fighting have their own forms of sociality.</font>
inhibitions on killing. Their screens then work as moral
+
 
mirrors: they see others who, like them, have family and
+
::Coeckelberg argumentiert, dass die "Piloten" unbemannter Kleinbomber auch in dieser Funktion soziale Wesen mit kognitven und moralischen Kapazitäten sind. Sie verhalten sich u.a. nach ethischen Gesichtspunkten. Der Drohneneinsatz erfolgt in einem speziellen techno-sozialen Rahmen, nämlich der militärischen Fernaufklärung. Was lässt sich daraus für moralische Überlegungen ableiten? 
friends, have bodies, are vulnerable too.
+
 
 +
Thus, although one cannot deny the physical, social, and moral distancing effects of the technological practice, as embodied and social beings, drone pilots are likely to <font color="purple">experience some empathetic bridging when they view their targets</font> and therefore do not that easily overcome their inhibitions on killing. Their screens then work as moral mirrors: they see others who, like them, have family and friends, have bodies, are vulnerable too.
 +
 
 +
::Aus der Einbettung in "their own forms of sociality" folgt ("thus") Empathie ("empathic bridging") mit den zu tötenden Zielobjekten. Die Monitore, auf denen Lebewesen zu sehen sind, erweisen sich als Spiegel der Moral. Die über einen längeren Zeitraum und mit hoher Detailgenauigkeit mögliche Observation "vermenschlicht" die Feinde. Darin unterscheiden sich Drohnen von den anonymen Vernichtungswaffen des vergangenen Jahrhunderts. <font color="purple">Es fragt sich allerdings, ob der genannte soziale Rahmen der Drohnensteuerung tatsächlich nahelegt, avisierte Opfer als verletzliches Gegenüber zu sehen.</font> So funktionieren militärische Einsatzteams nicht. --[[Benutzer:Anna|anna]] ([[Benutzer Diskussion:Anna|Diskussion]]) 11:48, 2. Jun. 2016 (CEST)   
  
 
...
 
...
  
It turns out
+
It turns out that the new ‘distancing’ technologies, which always also were ‘bridging’ technologies, are now creating a kind of epistemic bridge that somewhat mitigates the distancing effects that were morally problematic. The epistemic bridge then becomes a moral bridge, one that lets empathy cross to the other side, so to speak (albeit in one direction only). Of course there is still a significant qualitative epistemic and moral difference between a face-screen-face relation and a ‘real’ face-to-face relation. But at least the new technologies create the possibility for the screenfighters to bridge the moral distance between them and their ‘targets’ by imagining the lives of those they are supposed to kill.
that the new ‘distancing’ technologies, which always also
+
 
were ‘bridging’ technologies, are now creating a kind of
+
::Drohnenpiloten können ihre Opfer einzeln identifizieren und ihre Bewegungen mitverfolgen. Es ist möglich, zu ihnen ein persönliches Verhältnis aufzubauen und dabei moralische Einstellungen zu entwickeln. Allerdings handelt es sich um eine einseitige Affäre. Der quasi "invulnerable, all-powerful, and all-knowing god" leistet sich Mitgefühl. "Es tut mir leid, aber ich muss Dich beseitigen." --[[Benutzer:Anna|anna]] ([[Benutzer Diskussion:Anna|Diskussion]]) 11:48, 2. Jun. 2016 (CEST)
epistemic bridge that somewhat mitigates the distancing
+
 
effects that were morally problematic. The epistemic
+
== Ein Gedankenexperiment ==
bridge then becomes a moral bridge, one that lets empathy
+
 
cross to the other side, so to speak (albeit in one direction
+
Die Argumentationsstruktur ohne Krieg und Kriegsrecht.
only). Of course there is still a significant qualitative
+
 
epistemic and moral difference between a face-screen-face
+
Eine Elektrizitätswerk versorgt die Haushalte einer Gemeinde. Es gibt Konsumentinnen, die ihre Stromrechnung längere Zeit nicht zahlen. Das E-Werk sendet eine Angestellte, die dem Haushalt den Zugang sperrt und den Stromzähler abmontiert.
relation and a ‘real’ face-to-face relation. But at least the
+
 
new technologies create the possibility for the screenfighters to bridge the moral distance between them and their
+
In einem Schritt der Verwaltungsvereinfachung wird das Prozedere geändert. Im neuen Ablauf lässt sich der Strom zentral im E-Werk selbst abschalten.
‘targets’ by imagining the lives of those they are supposed
+
 
to kill.
+
Nun stellt sich heraus, dass in einem Haushalt eine Überwachungskamera installiert ist und dass das E-Werk Zugang zu dieser Kamera besitzt. Die Beamtin kann, wenn sie den Strom abschaltet, die Vorgänge innerhalb dieses Haushaltes verfolgen.
 +
 
 +
Ändert sich dadurch die moralische Einschätzung der Maßnahme? Wird die moralische Beurteilung des Abschaltens verändert, wenn die Akteurin sich ein Bild von den Betroffenen machen kann?
  
 
== Ethische Einbahnstraßen ==
 
== Ethische Einbahnstraßen ==
Zeile 199: Zeile 88:
 
=== Kein Duell. ein Tötungsplan ===
 
=== Kein Duell. ein Tötungsplan ===
  
Geographical contextualization of
+
Geographical contextualization of intimacy highlights that an individual’s status within the wider conflict is only one part of this issue. Being singled out for killing is an act of spatial intimacy. The drone operator’s detailed knowledge of the life and death of the target can serve to partially restore the visceral personal experience of combat that distance has done so much to negate. Rather than “screening” the killer from the killed, the drone operator experiences some of the intimacy of combat that phenomenological approaches to ethics see as important to understanding the distinct ethical relationship between combatants in war.
intimacy highlights that an individual’s status within the wider conflict is only one part of this
+
 
issue. Being singled out for killing is an act of spatial intimacy, and — for one of the parties –
+
...
the drone operator — may involve the restoration of a mediated phenomenological intimacy of
+
 
combat that, rather the “screening” the killer from the killed, can restore a facsimile of the
+
Just war’s traditional categories remain connected to the Clausewitzian paradigm of war as analogous to a duel, both in micro-terms of individual engagements and macro-terms of the relationship between the parties. <font color="purple">Asymmetry challenges the duel metaphor’s ability to ground ethical assessment</font>. Coeckelbergh highlights this in terms of a phenomenological ethics indebted to Heidegger and Levinas focused on epistemic relations, but it applies equally to more familiar just war approaches. The technologically mediated asymmetric battlespace produces the distant intimacy of drone strikes as a very particular ethical relationship. This reinforces asymmetry and adds to the potential for ethical assessment of the use of military force via posing questions about the spatial production of ethical subjectivity. <font color="purple">The ethical status of individuals becomes dependent on their location in battlespace, which, in the case of drone operators and targets, takes a very distinctive form that warps the usual account of the relationship between physical and emotional distance</font>.
visceral personal experience of previous forms of combat. The reality of drone strikes
+
 
departs from this ideal.
+
Moving beyond Coeckelbergh’s account of this process, though, critical geographical appreciation helps to reveal how just war theory’s under-developed account of space its reliance on the Clausewitzian metaphor — creates ethical asymmetry such that the ethical subjectivity of drone targets becomes entirely dependent on the construction of space by those targeting them.
 +
 
 +
=== Individualität ohne Reziprozität  ===
 +
 
 +
<font color="purple">What is most important from an ethical perspective about dronespace is asymmetry</font>. As critical political geographers stress, and our brief consideration of space illustrates, space is a political concept rooted in and expressive of power relationships. The construction, possession, and utilization of knowledge within a spatial context that itself manifests power inequalities creates, enables and legitimizes a relationship that, in this instance, is distinctively, possibly uniquely, asymmetrical. <font color="purple">Dronespace places all of the cards — every one of them — in the hand of the drone operator. Distant intimacy is ethically significant and problematic because it challenges some basic concepts typically deployed to establish, understand, and assess the ethical quality of relationships between human beings and the choices that are possible</font>. Distant intimacy requires dronespace to establish and attempt to legitimise the distinct asymmetry of a relationship that is ethically unidirectional.
 +
 
 +
<font color="purple">The first challenge is to the target’s autonomy</font>. Autonomy is a major component of just war debates, especially during the last decade as more formal analytical philosophical work has become increasingly prominent. A shift towards analyses of just war categories and concepts rooted within a rights-based approach stresses how targeting decisions and the liability of those targeted are complex choices. “Role-based” accounts, such as Michael Walzer’s analysis of the combatant/noncombatant boundary, ascribe liability to lethal force principally on the basis of adoption of a role.
 +
 
 +
This is challenged by rights-based accounts arguing that liability to lethal force must reflect something specific about the targeted individual: they have done something (or be imminently about to do something) to which lethal force is an appropriate response. This stresses the ethical importance of the autonomous
 +
choice of the individual to engage in activity that they know renders them potentially liable to lethal force. However, <font color="purple">autonomy is retained, at least partially, in conventional military situations because humans may cease those actions through surrender or withdrawal from military operations</font>.
 +
 
 +
<font color="purple">You cannot surrender to a Reaper. Within dronespace the target’s autonomy is fundamentally compromised</font>. That is true, of course, for a B-52 bomber, Tomahawk, or MX missile, or a host of other weapons systems. Yet these do not claim the intimacy of drones —  the discriminatory precision based on enhanced intelligence gathering and personalized targeting. By making military operations personal, drones exacerbate the problem of less discriminate weapons systems that obliterate individual autonomy by their nature, by holding out a promise of precision that is a one-way deal. <font color="purple">The drone deployer can exercise precision, ostensibly restoring the connection between warfare and individual culpability rights-based ethics demands for the use of force, yet this is strictly one-way. Ostensible respect for the target’s autonomy comes at the paradoxical price of removing their autonomy over their fate.</font>
 +
 
 +
<font color="purple">They are targeted as an autonomous individual — a specific person — yet are denied the last resort of individual autonomy in warfare: the chance to surrender</font>.
  
 
...
 
...
  
Just war’s traditional categories remain connected to the Clausewitzian paradigm of
+
As critical consideration of space highlights, it is not the distance between drone operator and target at the moment of attack that is ethically significant. It is the construction of fourdimensional space in which the drone deployer claims authority over every aspect of the target’s life—past, present and future — and the information assessed to determine the moment and manner of its ending in a system to which the target has no access. <font color="purple">While the intimate knowledge of target’s lives drone operators possess may restore some element of their humanity in the eyes of the operator, it is nevertheless a humanity that it constructed solely and exclusively on terms set by the operator</font>.
war as analogous to a duel, both in micro-terms of individual engagements and macro-terms
 
of the relationship between the parties. Asymmetry challenges the duel metaphor’s ability to
 
ground ethical assessment. Coeckelbergh highlights this in terms of a phenomenological
 
ethics indebted to Heidegger and Levinas focused on epistemic relations, but it applies
 
equally to more familiar just war approaches. The technologically mediated asymmetric
 
battlespace produces the distant intimacy of drone strikes as a very particular ethical
 
relationship. This reinforces asymmetry and adds to the potential for ethical assessment of
 
the use of military force via posing questions about the spatial production of ethical
 
subjectivity. The ethical status of individuals becomes dependent on their location in
 
battlespace, which, in the case of drone operators and targets, takes a very distinctive form
 
that warps the usual account of the relationship between physical and emotional distance.
 
Moving beyond Coeckelbergh’s account of this process, though, critical geographical
 
appreciation helps to reveal how just war theory’s under-developed account of space—its
 
reliance on the Clausewitzian metaphor—creates ethical asymmetry such that the ethical
 
subjectivity of drone targets becomes entirely dependent on the construction of space by
 
those targeting them.
 
  
 +
...
 +
 +
As right-based analytical philosophy gains prominence in just war theory, the significance of individual autonomy and liability increases and the paradox of distant intimacy is more fully revealed. <font color="purple">Respect for and protection of human rights is ostensibly enhanced by drone technologies via improved compliance with discrimination and proportionality. Yet, simultaneously, the rights-holding, autonomous human being underpinning the necessity for discrimination and proportionality is negated by the asymmetry of dronespace</font>, extending far beyond the location and moment of attack, to include construction of a four-dimensional space in which the target’s autonomy is both personalised and removed.
  
===  ===
+
...
  
The distant intimacy of drones serves as a striking illustration of spatial flexibility.The space
+
The physical invulnerability of drone operators shatters a commonplace element of conventional just war thinking, that is, the moral equality of combatants that establishes reciprocal acknowledgement of the distinctive position each occupies. Reciprocity manifests in various ways, most obviously via the combatants’ shared physical vulnerability. ... The extent of and respect for reciprocity is variable, of course, and collapses entirely on occasion, but the distant intimacy of dronespace renders this formulation inapplicable.
where drones operate is not just their immediate surroundings, spanning as that does
 
thousands of miles between the operator in, for instance, Nevada and their target in Pakistan’s
 
Swat valley and the drone’s service base in Afghanistan. As noted, weapons operators have
 
been very distant from their targets for a long time. The space is more extensive,
 
incorporating the virtual space of data streams that have brought specific, individual target of
 
the drone to the attention of the operator’s commanders. It also includes the satellite systems
 
that enable communication between operator and drone, making it extra-terrestrial, too. All of
 
this is held together by a real-time temporality. The concept of “assemblage” has been applied
 
to drones by Williams to show how drone operators can be understood as elements or
 
components of a complex technological system.53 Similarly, Coeckelbergh points towards
 
science, technology and society (STS) scholarship as stressing the networked construction of
 
knowledge of the target.54
 
What is most important from an ethical perspective about dronespace is asymmetry.
 
As critical political geographers stress, and our brief consideration of space illustrates, space
 
is a political concept rooted in and expressive of power relationships. The construction,
 
possession, and utilization of knowledge within a spatial context that itself manifests power
 
inequalities creates, enables and legitimizes a relationship that, in this instance, is
 
distinctively, possibly uniquely, asymmetrical. Dronespace places all of the cards—every one
 
of them—in the hand of the drone operator. Distant intimacy is ethically significant and
 
problematic because it challenges some basic concepts typically deployed to establish,
 
understand, and assess the ethical quality of relationships between human beings and the
 
choices that are possible. Distant intimacy requires dronespace to establish and attempt to
 
legitimise the distinct asymmetry of a relationship that is ethically unidirectional.
 
  
The first challenge is to the target’s autonomy. Autonomy is a major component of
+
While the drone operator knows a great deal about the target and holds them in a position of immense vulnerability, the target cannot know anything about their interlocutor and the vulnerability they suffer arises wholly from the intimacy the technology the deploy creates, not in any way from the conscious intentions of the target. Reciprocity through mutual vulnerability is inapplicable.  
just war debates, especially during the last decade as more formal analytical philosophical
 
work has become increasingly prominent.55 A shift towards analyses of just war categories
 
and concepts rooted within a rights-based approach stresses how targeting decisions and the
 
liability of those targeted are complex choices. “Role-based” accounts, such as Michael
 
Walzer’s analysis of the combatant/noncombatant boundary, ascribe liability to lethal force
 
principally on the basis of adoption of a role.56 This is challenged by rights-based accounts
 
arguing that liability to lethal force must reflect something specific about the targeted
 
individual: they have done something (or be imminently about to do something) to which
 
lethal force is an appropriate response. This stresses the ethical importance of the autonomous
 
choice of the individual to engage in activity that they know renders them potentially liable to
 
lethal force. However, autonomy is retained, at least partially, in conventional military
 
situations because humans may cease those actions through surrender or withdrawal from
 
military operations.
 
You cannot surrender to a Reaper.57 Within dronespace the target’s autonomy is
 
fundamentally compromised. That is true, of course, for a B-52 bomber, Tomahawk, or MX
 
missile, or a host of other weapons systems. Yet these do not claim the intimacy of drones—
 
the discriminatory precision based on enhanced intelligence gathering and personalized
 
targeting. By making military operations personal, drones exacerbate the problem of less
 
discriminate weapons systems that obliterate individual autonomy by their nature, by holding
 
out a promise of precision that is a one-way deal. The drone deployer can exercise precision,
 
ostensibly restoring the connection between warfare and individual culpability rights-based
 
ethics demands for the use of force, yet this is strictly one-way. Ostensible respect for the
 
target’s autonomy comes at the paradoxical price of removing their autonomy over their fate.
 
They are targeted as an autonomous individual—a specific person—yet are denied the last
 
resort of individual autonomy in warfare: the chance to surrender. This, therefore, is a more
 
extensive objection on the grounds of radical asymmetry than is usually considered,58 which
 
focuses on the moment of attack “the intuition … that killing someone in such a manner is
 
profoundly disrespectful … such distance makes warfare seem too clinical or cold-hearted.”59
 
As critical consideration of space highlights, it is not the distance between drone operator and
 
target at the moment of attack that is ethically significant. It is the construction of fourdimensional space in which the drone deployer claims authority over every aspect of the
 
target’s life—past, present and future—and the information assessed to determine the
 
moment and manner of its ending in a system to which the target has no access. While the
 
intimate knowledge of target’s lives drone operators possess may restore some element of
 
  
11
+
...
  
�their humanity in the eyes of the operator,60 it is nevertheless a humanity that it constructed
+
<font color="purple">The distant intimacy of drones represents the apogee and nadir of the individuation of military action.</font>
solely and exclusively on terms set by the operator.
 
Within dronespace, reinforcing the novelty of its asymmetry, the drone operator’s
 
autonomy is enhanced by choices drones provide through data gathering and processing
 
potential and the long-loiter capability that increases options over when to attack. That all
 
data about the target is not subject to challenge by the target further compromises their
 
autonomy. The target cannot intercede in debates taking place among the drone operator, their
 
commanders, legal advisers and others about whether and when they are to die. Again, this is
 
a difference of degree in relation to other weapons systems. The meticulous planning of firebombing raids against Dresden or Cologne, for instance, allowed no moment of consideration
 
for the views of their targets, but the indiscriminate and impersonal nature of such attacks
 
marks the crucial point of departure from the intimacy of drone strikes and the highly
 
personalized asymmetry of dronespace. As right-based analytical philosophy gains
 
prominence in just war theory, the significance of individual autonomy and liability increases
 
and the paradox of distant intimacy is more fully revealed. Respect for and protection of
 
human rights is ostensibly enhanced by drone technologies via improved compliance with
 
discrimination and proportionality. Yet, simultaneously, the rights-holding, autonomous
 
human being underpinning the necessity for discrimination and proportionality is negated by
 
the asymmetry of dronespace., extending far beyond the location and moment of attack, to
 
include construction of a four-dimensional space in which the target’s autonomy is both
 
personalised and removed. Uwe Steinhoff suggests that, for some, war has become ‘pest
 
control’,61 and whilst the argument here is different from that underpinning the point
 
Steinhoff critiques, the asymmetry it invokes is not wholly dissimilar: within dronespace the
 
target’s autonomy is completely conditional on the decisions of the drone deployer.
 
Reciprocity is a second ethical principle rewritten in dronespace. The physical
 
invulnerability of drone operators shatters a commonplace element of conventional just war
 
thinking, that is, the moral equality of combatants that establishes reciprocal
 
acknowledgement of the distinctive position each occupies. Reciprocity manifests in various
 
ways, most obviously via the combatants’ shared physical vulnerability. This need not be a
 
narrow interpretation—the attacker is equally vulnerable to the attacked at the moment of
 
attack—but it represents an intuition about war that those who participate are vulnerable and
 
mutual vulnerability establishes a degree of reciprocity among combatants.62 Critics argue
 
that any notion of war as a ‘fair fight’ is long gone and, in any case, it is morally correct to
 
protect a just warrior.63 The extent of and respect for reciprocity is variable, of course, and
 
collapses entirely on occasion, but the distant intimacy of dronespace renders this formulation
 
12
 
  
�inapplicable. While the drone operator knows a great deal about the target and holds them in a
+
The apogee because strikes can target individuals subject to sustained surveillance drawing on multiple, sometimes real-time, intelligence sources, granting unprecedented insight into the target’s life. The nadir because the target’s autonomy as an individual is removed through the absence of meaningful participation in the process that makes them a target or the possession of any significant means of self-defense.  
position of immense vulnerability, the target cannot know anything about their interlocutor
 
and the vulnerability they suffer arises wholly from the intimacy the technology the deploy
 
creates, not in any way from the conscious intentions of the target. Reciprocity through
 
mutual vulnerability is inapplicable.  
 
  
Not all just war theorists accept the moral equality of combatants. Jeff McMahan
 
argues that combatants in an unjust cause are not the moral equals of those fighting for a just
 
cause, and acts of violence they commit in pursuit of injustice are morally unjustifiable.64
 
McMahan offers powerful arguments for skepticism about a critique of drones through the
 
absence of reciprocity of vulnerability. McMahan’s argument, however, assumes that unjust
 
combatants fighting for an unjust cause pose a real risk to the just warriors they face, but
 
those unjust warriors may not invoke moral equality rooted in their right to self-defense in
 
any efforts they may make to resist. In the case of drones, there is no possibility of intentional
 
harmful resistance by the target. The right to self-defence that provides the bedrock of
 
McMahan’s critique is effectively inoperable. While that does not fully refute McMahan’s
 
point—the defenders of Hiroshima had no operational possibility of resisting the Enola
 
Gay—it reinforces how the accumulation of differences of degree in asymmetry and the
 
distinctiveness of dronespace consistently stretches the logic of just war categories and
 
concepts to reveal the necessity of explicit critical consideration of spatial issues.
 
The distant intimacy of drones represents the apogee and nadir of the individuation of
 
military action. The apogee because strikes can target individuals subject to sustained
 
surveillance drawing on multiple, sometimes real-time, intelligence sources, granting
 
unprecedented insight into the target’s life. The nadir because the target’s autonomy as an
 
individual is removed through the absence of meaningful participation in the process that
 
makes them a target or the possession of any significant means of self-defense. McMahan’s
 
rejection of combatants’ moral equality on the basis that those fighting an unjust war are not
 
the moral equals of their just adversaries does not strip those unjust warriors of their right to
 
self-defense should they come under unjust attack.65 Strawser’s argument for the duty to
 
minimize risks faced by just warriors does not strip the right to self-defense against unjust
 
attack from their targets.66 Both McMahan and Strawser, however, miss how dronespace
 
necessarily precludes reciprocity: it strips from targets their right to self-defense as part of
 
their incorporation into this novel spatial realm. In the case of signature strikes, it reduces
 
them to data streams representing patterns of behavior suggesting potential future harm or
 
“affiliation” with named individuals.
 
  
 
----
 
----
 
[[Category:Drohnen. SS 2016]]
 
[[Category:Drohnen. SS 2016]]

Aktuelle Version vom 12. Dezember 2016, 16:20 Uhr

Ethische Brücken

Exzerpte aus:

Mark Coeckelbergh: Drones, information technology, and distance: mapping the moral epistemology of remote fighting. In: Ethics and Information Technology (2013) 15:87–98. DOI 10.1007/s10676-013-9313-6.

Raufereien, Totschlag

In body-to-body fighting, the fighter sees the eyes and body of his opponent, and has body contact with him. He smells him, feels him, hears him. The fighters see, smell, and feel the skin, the bodily movements, the breathing, the sweat, and perhaps the blood of their opponent. During the fight they are frequently and literally in touch. This has epistemic and moral consequences.

The fighter knows that his opponent is also a person and a human being, who also struggles to win, who has feelings (e.g. hate), and who also feels pain when he is hit. The fighter is also very aware of his own body; in a sense his body is his weapon, the fighter ‘is’ weapon and agent at the same time. Moreover, he receives immediate feedback from his opponent, everything he does meets concrete, physical resistance. He also feels everything the opponent does. He is totally involved in the fight. He is immersed in it, is highly concentrated. In his experience there is no mind separated from a body.

In the experience of what Csikszentmihalyi calls ‘flow’, the fighter is one. He does not and cannot take (reflective) distance or distance himself from his opponent. The fighters are ‘condemned’ to one another. Furthermore, the fight is a personal matter: he fights with a particular person, not with an ‘enemy’. He knows his opponent or, if not, he gets to know the person during the fight in various ways. During the fight the fighters also share the same physical, geographical space, for example a bar or a street corner. Perhaps they even live in the same place (village, city) and share the same social background and culture.

Töten aus Distanz

Drone bombing and, more generally remote controlled military robots, then appears to be the ultimate military distancing technology. The fighter’s own vulnerability is close to zero (or so it seems) and those he is ordered to kill appear as remote targets. The separation between fighter and opponent is complete. Drones seem to be illustrative of a move towards a kind of ‘final’ stage in the history of military technology understood as a history of distancing technology, in which the distance between fighter and ‘the ground’ is maximized. If there is a next step, it is fighting and killing from space—a step which I believe has already been taken.

It seems that in the history of military technology there is a kind of distancing arms race: the opponent will (also) develop offensive and defensive technologies that create distance, and the race is about who can create a fighting position that is most distant in order to decrease one’s own vulnerability (defensive reason); yet at the same time the technology needs to be ‘bridging’ enough to enable killing of the distant target (offensive reason). Drones seem to do that job perfectly.

...

Indeed, there seems to be something cowardly and unfair about remote killing. The problem with regard to fairness in the case of drones is not only or not so much the unequal power of the parties on the ‘attack’ side (e.g. missile vs. gun), but the unequal vulnerability on the ‘defence’ side.

The first party does not commit his life to the fight, does not risk his life; nothing is at stake for the drone fighter — at least not in terms of human lives (the vehicle is still vulnerable, of course, and its loss is regarded by the military as substantial).

This asymmetry may be regarded as unfair, and in terms of virtue and vice the drone fighter could be called ‘cowardly’. On the other hand, he and those who order him to kill also carry a huge responsibility, somewhat comparable to an invulnerable, all-powerful, and all-knowing god who selects the weeds and removes them —here by, literally, descending from heaven to earth and strike the poor earthlings. Who can carry that kind of responsibility?

Die Asymmetrie besteht darin, dass Menschen wehrlos einer Tötungsmaschine ausgesetzt sind. Sie wird nach Coeckelberg dadurch relativiert, dass die Tötenden eine riesige, gottähnliche Verantwortung tragen. In der Tat: Wer kann eine solche Verantwortung übernehmen? Aber vor allem: Inwiefern mildert es die Asymmetrie, wenn er die Verantwortung dafür übernimmt, Menschen ohne die Möglichkeit zur Gegenwehr zu töten? --anna (Diskussion) 11:03, 2. Jun. 2016 (CEST)

However, this picture of the practice as necessarily implying a huge moral distance ... is not entirely correct and fair. Drone fighting is rather different from artillery fighting and certainly different from discharging ‘some random bullet’, as Don Quixote describes the artillery of his day.


Menschen als Zielscheiben

Thus, I wish to add a Heideggerian hermeneutical point in addition to the empirical-psychological one already acknowledged in the literature. The empirical-psychological version of the thesis assumes that there is a human opponent which we perceive in a morally neutral, objective way and which then can or cannot receive our sympathy, depending on the distance created by the technology. The Heideggerian assumption I start from is that there is no neutral way of conceiving of the opponent, that the opponent already appears to us as a target because of the technology, as a standing-to-be-killed. .... The technology and the distance it creates does not only produce a barrier between our empathic capacity and the opponent, it changes the very way we perceive that opponent. In this sense, the technology creates a different world for the fighter. This has moral consequences.

...

In particular, the work of Dreyfus and Borgmann suggests that electronic technologies are morally problematic because they do not promote engagement and commitment.

... they (i.e. electronic devices, h.h.) make life all too easy in the sense that they do not ask us to directly and bodily engage with our material and physical environment. The distance de-skills us: we become dependent on the technology and we do no longer know how it works, what it does, and indeed what we are doing. ... The moral distance between us and the world, and between us and others, increases.

Applied to the case of electronic weapon technology, this analysis of modern and contemporary information technology would presumably imply that the fighters who watch the screens work in a way that does not create a kind of knowledge that is grounded in lived bodily experience, in handling things on the ground, in skilfully engaging with what happens on the battlefield and with others, and that therefore we have a moral problem here since, because of the new technological practice, the fighter cannot see the face of the other and becomes both experientially and morally disengaged from the world and detached from others.

This renders what we could call ‘screenfighting’ morally problematic. It seems that the killing is easier since the practice appears to the pilots as a videogame: promoting an entirely detached view of the battlefield, it suggests that you can kill as much as you want; your action does not have real moral consequences. The ‘easier’ the technology, the more moral and social distance it creates.

But is this an adequate analysis of the actual practice of drone fighting?

Drohnensteuerung: Spiegel der Moral?

Furthermore, as social beings the members of the drone crew are (still) part of a social environment and network at the airbase and elsewhere (e.g. family and friends). They may not literally see people and talk to people while flying the plane, but their cognitive and moral way of dealing with the world and with others is deeply shaped by the forms of sociality of which they are part and ‘in’ which they live. When they enter the airbase, they do not completely leave behind ‘home’. And the military and the practice of drone fighting have their own forms of sociality.

Coeckelberg argumentiert, dass die "Piloten" unbemannter Kleinbomber auch in dieser Funktion soziale Wesen mit kognitven und moralischen Kapazitäten sind. Sie verhalten sich u.a. nach ethischen Gesichtspunkten. Der Drohneneinsatz erfolgt in einem speziellen techno-sozialen Rahmen, nämlich der militärischen Fernaufklärung. Was lässt sich daraus für moralische Überlegungen ableiten?

Thus, although one cannot deny the physical, social, and moral distancing effects of the technological practice, as embodied and social beings, drone pilots are likely to experience some empathetic bridging when they view their targets and therefore do not that easily overcome their inhibitions on killing. Their screens then work as moral mirrors: they see others who, like them, have family and friends, have bodies, are vulnerable too.

Aus der Einbettung in "their own forms of sociality" folgt ("thus") Empathie ("empathic bridging") mit den zu tötenden Zielobjekten. Die Monitore, auf denen Lebewesen zu sehen sind, erweisen sich als Spiegel der Moral. Die über einen längeren Zeitraum und mit hoher Detailgenauigkeit mögliche Observation "vermenschlicht" die Feinde. Darin unterscheiden sich Drohnen von den anonymen Vernichtungswaffen des vergangenen Jahrhunderts. Es fragt sich allerdings, ob der genannte soziale Rahmen der Drohnensteuerung tatsächlich nahelegt, avisierte Opfer als verletzliches Gegenüber zu sehen. So funktionieren militärische Einsatzteams nicht. --anna (Diskussion) 11:48, 2. Jun. 2016 (CEST)

...

It turns out that the new ‘distancing’ technologies, which always also were ‘bridging’ technologies, are now creating a kind of epistemic bridge that somewhat mitigates the distancing effects that were morally problematic. The epistemic bridge then becomes a moral bridge, one that lets empathy cross to the other side, so to speak (albeit in one direction only). Of course there is still a significant qualitative epistemic and moral difference between a face-screen-face relation and a ‘real’ face-to-face relation. But at least the new technologies create the possibility for the screenfighters to bridge the moral distance between them and their ‘targets’ by imagining the lives of those they are supposed to kill.

Drohnenpiloten können ihre Opfer einzeln identifizieren und ihre Bewegungen mitverfolgen. Es ist möglich, zu ihnen ein persönliches Verhältnis aufzubauen und dabei moralische Einstellungen zu entwickeln. Allerdings handelt es sich um eine einseitige Affäre. Der quasi "invulnerable, all-powerful, and all-knowing god" leistet sich Mitgefühl. "Es tut mir leid, aber ich muss Dich beseitigen." --anna (Diskussion) 11:48, 2. Jun. 2016 (CEST)

Ein Gedankenexperiment

Die Argumentationsstruktur ohne Krieg und Kriegsrecht.

Eine Elektrizitätswerk versorgt die Haushalte einer Gemeinde. Es gibt Konsumentinnen, die ihre Stromrechnung längere Zeit nicht zahlen. Das E-Werk sendet eine Angestellte, die dem Haushalt den Zugang sperrt und den Stromzähler abmontiert.

In einem Schritt der Verwaltungsvereinfachung wird das Prozedere geändert. Im neuen Ablauf lässt sich der Strom zentral im E-Werk selbst abschalten.

Nun stellt sich heraus, dass in einem Haushalt eine Überwachungskamera installiert ist und dass das E-Werk Zugang zu dieser Kamera besitzt. Die Beamtin kann, wenn sie den Strom abschaltet, die Vorgänge innerhalb dieses Haushaltes verfolgen.

Ändert sich dadurch die moralische Einschätzung der Maßnahme? Wird die moralische Beurteilung des Abschaltens verändert, wenn die Akteurin sich ein Bild von den Betroffenen machen kann?

Ethische Einbahnstraßen

Exzerpte aus:

John Williams: Distant Intimacy: Space, Drones, and Just War. In: Ethics & International Affairs / Volume 29 / Issue 01 / Spring 2015, pp 93-110

Kein Duell. ein Tötungsplan

Geographical contextualization of intimacy highlights that an individual’s status within the wider conflict is only one part of this issue. Being singled out for killing is an act of spatial intimacy. The drone operator’s detailed knowledge of the life and death of the target can serve to partially restore the visceral personal experience of combat that distance has done so much to negate. Rather than “screening” the killer from the killed, the drone operator experiences some of the intimacy of combat that phenomenological approaches to ethics see as important to understanding the distinct ethical relationship between combatants in war.

...

Just war’s traditional categories remain connected to the Clausewitzian paradigm of war as analogous to a duel, both in micro-terms of individual engagements and macro-terms of the relationship between the parties. Asymmetry challenges the duel metaphor’s ability to ground ethical assessment. Coeckelbergh highlights this in terms of a phenomenological ethics indebted to Heidegger and Levinas focused on epistemic relations, but it applies equally to more familiar just war approaches. The technologically mediated asymmetric battlespace produces the distant intimacy of drone strikes as a very particular ethical relationship. This reinforces asymmetry and adds to the potential for ethical assessment of the use of military force via posing questions about the spatial production of ethical subjectivity. The ethical status of individuals becomes dependent on their location in battlespace, which, in the case of drone operators and targets, takes a very distinctive form that warps the usual account of the relationship between physical and emotional distance.

Moving beyond Coeckelbergh’s account of this process, though, critical geographical appreciation helps to reveal how just war theory’s under-developed account of space — its reliance on the Clausewitzian metaphor — creates ethical asymmetry such that the ethical subjectivity of drone targets becomes entirely dependent on the construction of space by those targeting them.

Individualität ohne Reziprozität

What is most important from an ethical perspective about dronespace is asymmetry. As critical political geographers stress, and our brief consideration of space illustrates, space is a political concept rooted in and expressive of power relationships. The construction, possession, and utilization of knowledge within a spatial context that itself manifests power inequalities creates, enables and legitimizes a relationship that, in this instance, is distinctively, possibly uniquely, asymmetrical. Dronespace places all of the cards — every one of them — in the hand of the drone operator. Distant intimacy is ethically significant and problematic because it challenges some basic concepts typically deployed to establish, understand, and assess the ethical quality of relationships between human beings and the choices that are possible. Distant intimacy requires dronespace to establish and attempt to legitimise the distinct asymmetry of a relationship that is ethically unidirectional.

The first challenge is to the target’s autonomy. Autonomy is a major component of just war debates, especially during the last decade as more formal analytical philosophical work has become increasingly prominent. A shift towards analyses of just war categories and concepts rooted within a rights-based approach stresses how targeting decisions and the liability of those targeted are complex choices. “Role-based” accounts, such as Michael Walzer’s analysis of the combatant/noncombatant boundary, ascribe liability to lethal force principally on the basis of adoption of a role.

This is challenged by rights-based accounts arguing that liability to lethal force must reflect something specific about the targeted individual: they have done something (or be imminently about to do something) to which lethal force is an appropriate response. This stresses the ethical importance of the autonomous choice of the individual to engage in activity that they know renders them potentially liable to lethal force. However, autonomy is retained, at least partially, in conventional military situations because humans may cease those actions through surrender or withdrawal from military operations.

You cannot surrender to a Reaper. Within dronespace the target’s autonomy is fundamentally compromised. That is true, of course, for a B-52 bomber, Tomahawk, or MX missile, or a host of other weapons systems. Yet these do not claim the intimacy of drones — the discriminatory precision based on enhanced intelligence gathering and personalized targeting. By making military operations personal, drones exacerbate the problem of less discriminate weapons systems that obliterate individual autonomy by their nature, by holding out a promise of precision that is a one-way deal. The drone deployer can exercise precision, ostensibly restoring the connection between warfare and individual culpability rights-based ethics demands for the use of force, yet this is strictly one-way. Ostensible respect for the target’s autonomy comes at the paradoxical price of removing their autonomy over their fate.

They are targeted as an autonomous individual — a specific person — yet are denied the last resort of individual autonomy in warfare: the chance to surrender.

...

As critical consideration of space highlights, it is not the distance between drone operator and target at the moment of attack that is ethically significant. It is the construction of fourdimensional space in which the drone deployer claims authority over every aspect of the target’s life—past, present and future — and the information assessed to determine the moment and manner of its ending in a system to which the target has no access. While the intimate knowledge of target’s lives drone operators possess may restore some element of their humanity in the eyes of the operator, it is nevertheless a humanity that it constructed solely and exclusively on terms set by the operator.

...

As right-based analytical philosophy gains prominence in just war theory, the significance of individual autonomy and liability increases and the paradox of distant intimacy is more fully revealed. Respect for and protection of human rights is ostensibly enhanced by drone technologies via improved compliance with discrimination and proportionality. Yet, simultaneously, the rights-holding, autonomous human being underpinning the necessity for discrimination and proportionality is negated by the asymmetry of dronespace, extending far beyond the location and moment of attack, to include construction of a four-dimensional space in which the target’s autonomy is both personalised and removed.

...

The physical invulnerability of drone operators shatters a commonplace element of conventional just war thinking, that is, the moral equality of combatants that establishes reciprocal acknowledgement of the distinctive position each occupies. Reciprocity manifests in various ways, most obviously via the combatants’ shared physical vulnerability. ... The extent of and respect for reciprocity is variable, of course, and collapses entirely on occasion, but the distant intimacy of dronespace renders this formulation inapplicable.

While the drone operator knows a great deal about the target and holds them in a position of immense vulnerability, the target cannot know anything about their interlocutor and the vulnerability they suffer arises wholly from the intimacy the technology the deploy creates, not in any way from the conscious intentions of the target. Reciprocity through mutual vulnerability is inapplicable.

...

The distant intimacy of drones represents the apogee and nadir of the individuation of military action.

The apogee because strikes can target individuals subject to sustained surveillance drawing on multiple, sometimes real-time, intelligence sources, granting unprecedented insight into the target’s life. The nadir because the target’s autonomy as an individual is removed through the absence of meaningful participation in the process that makes them a target or the possession of any significant means of self-defense.