Die Fußnoten zu Platon (OSP)
Die Fußnoten zu Platon (S. 202ff)
Basically, all of Plato's Socratic dialogues are examples of this critical dialogue; in them, Socrates often makes remarks about the need for critical dialogue. For example, in Crito, Socrates says, "Let us examine the question together, my dear friend, and if you make any objection while I am speaking, make it and I will listen to you" (48e). In Phaedo, he incites his interlocutor to criticize him by asking, "Do you think there is something lacking in my argument?" and in Euthydemus he remarks similarly: "There is nothing I would like better than to be refuted on these points" (295a). In Theaetetus and Clitophon, Socrates explains why the process of critique is always beneficial: "Either we shall find what we are going out after; or we shall be less inclined to think we know things which we don't know at all — and even that would be a reward we could not fairly be dissatisfied with" (187b–c); and, "Once I know my good and bad points, I will make it my practice to pursue and develop the former while ridding myself of the latter to the extent that I am able" (407a). For this reason, in academic discussion one should present a critique frankly and not try to please anyone (cf. Euthyphro, 14e; Protagoras, 319b, 336e; Republic, 336e).
- Das geht in die Richtung, die ich andernorts angesprochen habe. Der Dialog ist keine Gerichtsverhandlung, denn die vor Gericht sprechenden würden selbst nicht kritisiert werden wollen. Die Streitparteien haben ihre fixe Argumentation und es ist nicht in ihrem Interesse, dass sie diese Argumentation aufgeben (weil man sie dann womöglich verurteilen würde). Im sokratischen Dialog haben wir nur die Argumentationsinstrumente der Gerichtsverhandlung mit dabei, nicht aber deren Motivationslage und soziale Einbettung. Sokrates erachtet es als Freundschaftsdienst, die Lücken in seiner Argumentation zu entdecken. Und ich finde, diese Art mit jemanden zu reden sollte nicht nur, aber im AKAdemischen Diskurs am prägnantesten und stärksten, praktiziert werden.
Plato describes the idea of midwifery through the mouth of Socrates, whom he has say in one of his dialogues:
one thing which I have in common with the ordinary midwives is that I myself am barren of wisdom. The common reproach against me is that I am always asking questions of other people but never express my own views about anything, because there is no wisdom in me; and that is true enough. And the reason of it is this, that God compels me to attend the travail of others, but has forbidden me to procreate. So that I am not in any sense a wise man; I cannot claim as the child of my own soul any discovery worth the name of wisdom. But with those who associate with me it is different. At first some of them may give the impression of being ignorant and stupid; but as time goes on and our association continues, all whom God permits are seen to make progress — a progress which is amazing both to other people and to themselves. And yet it is clear that this is not due to anything they have learned from me; it is that they discover within themselves a multitude of beautiful things, which they bring forth into the light. (Plato, Theaetetus, 150c–d)
- Wenn wir uns Sokrates als Vorbild nehmen sollen, schlage ich vor, dass wir zusätzlich auch sein Gegenüber verstehen müssen. Wir sollten beide Rollen einnehmen können. Stellen wir uns vor, es gäbe Sokrates zweimal. Sokrates1 und sokrates2. Jeder versucht dem anderen sein Wissen zu aktivieren, obwohl beide der Überzeugung sind, sie hätten keines in sich. Sie müssten also den jweils anderen Sokrates helfen, sein Wissen zur Geburt zu bringen. Das wäre aus informatischer Sicht ein DeadLock.
- Daher müssen wir manchmal auch vorgeben, etwas zu wissen und im entscheidenden Moment bereit sein, es aufzugeben (Nämlich dann, wenn unsere eigene Argumentation ausgehebelt ist). Sokrates Methode hat also durchaus eine gewisse Hybris: Er gibt vor, von Gott nur in Kraft gesetzt zu sein, um anderen zu Wissen zu verhelfen. Er selbst hätte aber, kein Wissen in sich. Indem er zu dieser Erkenntnis kommt, steht er über seinem Gesprächspartner.
- Sokrates versteckt sein Wissen, um Pfeile/Geschosse in Form von Fragen herzustellen, die er auf die Aussagen seines Gegenübers anwenden. Solche Fragen könnte man aber genauso an Sokrates verstecktes/implizites Wissen stellen, wenn sie explizit wären. Trotzdem ist diese Rolle eine wichtige Rolle, denn sie zeigt, dass man das Modell des Wissenstransfers nicht benötigt. Es reicht manchmal, auf die ungeformten Aussagen des Gegenübers Pfeile von Fragen zu schießen, damit sie sich formen.--Andyk 11:37, 19. Nov. 2008 (CET)
Plutarch sums up: "Socrates was not engaged in teaching anything, but by exciting perplexities as if inducing the inception of labour-pains in young men he would arouse and quicken and help to deliver their innate conceptions; and his name for this was obstetric skill, since it does not, as other men pretend to do, implant in those who come upon it intelligence from without but shows that they have it native within themselves but undeveloped and confused and in need of nurture and stabilization" (Platonic Questions, 1000e).
The Socratic idea is that the purpose of teaching is to help someone learn to learn, to be able to pose questions. A precondition for that is puzzlement. In the dialogue Meno, the title character describes the Socratic teacher's effect:
Socrates, before I even met you I used to hear that you are always in a state of perplexity and that you bring others to the same state, and now I think you are bewitching and beguiling me, simply putting me under a spell, so that I am quite perplexed. Indeed, if a joke is in order, you seem, in appearance and in every other way, to be like the electric ray, for it too makes anyone who comes close and touches it feel numb, and you now seem to have had that kind of effect on me, for both my mind and my tongue are numb, and I have no answer to give you. (80a–b)
But this state of perplexity is ultimately for the better, as Socrates explains:
SOCRATES: Have we done him any harm by making him perplexed and numb as the torpedo fish does?
MENO: I do not think so.
SOCRATES: Indeed, we have probably achieved something relevant to finding out how matters stand, for now, as he does not know, he would be glad to find out, whereas before he thought he could easily make many fine speeches to large audiences about the square of double size and said that it must have a base twice as long.
MENO: So it seems.
SOCRATES: Do you think that before he would have tried to find out that which he thought he knew though he did not, before he fell into perplexity and realized he did not know and longed to know? (84a–c; see also Alcibiades, 106d)
The reason the Socratic teacher was also called a matchmaker was that it was his task to join people into giving birth together (Xenophon, Symposium, 3). Socrates describes his method: "With the best will in the world I undertake the business of match-making; and I think I am good enough — God willing — at guessing with whom they might profitably keep company. Many of them I have given away to Prodicus; and a great number also to other wise and inspired persons" (Plato, Theaetetus, 151b). Compare this to: "Someone asked Aristippus [a disciple of Socrates] how Socrates had helped him. He replied, `He enabled me to find for myself satisfying fellow-students of philosophy' " (Philodemus, Rhetoric, 1, 342.13).
The third Academy metaphor was that of the teacher as master of ceremonies (the symposiarkhos) at banquets. These took place in the evenings, and in conjunction with the dialogues of the day they were an essential learning experience. The purpose of these banquets was quite serious and intellectually ambitious — for example, the discussion of some heavyweight philosophical subject — but they were, in addition, powerfully experiential events. (Two great descriptions are the symposia of Plato and Xenophon.)
The symposiarch was responsible for the success of the banquets in two ways: first, from his elevated position he made sure that the intellectual goals of dialogue were attained; second, it was also his responsibility to ensure that none of the participants remained too stiff. To this latter end, he had two means at his disposal. First, he had the right to order the excessively stiff participants to drink more wine. If this did not work, the symposiarch could order the participant to remove his clothes and dance! The symposiarch used any means necessary to catalyze passionate contributions (cf. Plato, Symposium, 213e-14a).
