Aus "Meaning and Necessity"
It is the purpose of this article to clarify this controversial issue. T nature and implications of the acceptance of a language referring to a stract entities will first be discussed in general; it will be shown that using such a language does not imply embracing a Platonic ontology but is per fectly compatible with empiricism and strictly scientific thinking. The>q the special question of the role of abstract entities in semantics will be di cussed. It is hoped that the clarification of the issue will be useful to thoa! who would like to accept abstract entities in their work in mathematic physics, semantics, or any other field; it may help them to overcomi nominalistic scruples.
2. Linguistic Frameworks
Are there properties, classes, numbers, propositions? In order to under stand more clearly the nature of these and related problems, it is above al necessary to recognize a fundamental distinction between two kinds c questions concerning the existence or reality of entities. If someone wishe to speak in his language about a new kind of entities, he has to introduce system of new ways of speaking, subject to new rules; we shall call t
procedure the construction of a linguistic framework for the new entities i question. And now we must distinguish two kinds of questions of exist ence: first, questions of the existence of certain entities of the new kini within the framework; we call them internal questions; and second, quest tions concerning the existence or reality of the system of entities as a whop called external questions. Internal questions and possible answers to the are formulated with the help of the new forms of expressions. The answer may be found either by purely logical methods or by empirical method depending upon whether the framework is a logical or a factual one. A external question is of a problematic character which is in need of close examination.
The world of things. Let us consider as an example the simplest kind 4 entities dealt with in the everyday language: the spatio-temporally or = The terms "sentence" and "statement" are here used synonymously for declarative (i dicative, propositional) sentences.
2. LINGUISTIC FRAMEWORKS 207
dered system of observable things and events. Once we have accepted the thing language with its framework for things, we can raise and answer internal questions, e.g., "Is there a white piece of paper on my desk?", "Did King Arthur actually live?", "Are unicorns and centaurs real or merely imaginary?", and the like. These questions are to be answered by empirical investigations. Results of observations are evaluated according to certain rules as confirming or disconfirming evidence for possible answers. (This evaluation is usually carried out, of course, as a matter of habit rather than a deliberate, rational procedure. But it is possible, in a rational reconstruction, to lay down explicit rules for the evaluation. This is one of the main tasks of a pure, as distinguished from a psychological, epistemology.) The concept of reality occurring in these internal questions is an empirical, scientific, non-metaphysical concept. To recognize some-thing as a real thing or event means to succeed in incorporating it into the system of things at a particular space-time position so that it fits together with the other things recognized as real, according to the rules of the framework.
From these questions we must distinguish the external question of the reality of the thing world itself. In contrast to the former questions, this question is raised neither by the man in the street nor by scientists, but only by philosophers. Realists give an affirmative answer, subjective idealists a negative one, and the controversy goes on for centuries without ever being solved. And it cannot be solved because it is framed in a wrong way. To be real in the scientific sense means to be an element of the system; hence this concept cannot be meaningfully applied to the system itself. Those who raise the question of the reality of the thing world itself have perhaps in mind not a theoretical question as their formulation seems to suggest, but rather a practical question, a matter of a practical decision concerning the structure of our language. We have to make the choice whether or not to accept and use the forms of expression in the framework in question. In the case of this particular example, there is usually no deliberate choice because we all have accepted the thing language early in our lives as a matter of course. Nevertheless, we may regard it as a matter of decision in this sense: we are free to choose to continue using the thing language or not; in the latter case we could restrict ourselves to a language of sense-data and other "phenomenal" entities, or construct an alternative to the customary thing language with another structure, or, finally, we could refrain from speaking. If someone decides to accept the thing language, there is no objection against saying that he has accepted the world
zurück zu Carnaps "Toleranzprinzip", Quines "principle of charity" (T)
