

Seminar: **Gedanken und Blicke als Gespräche: Peirce' dialogische Semiotik**
(180161 SE)

2. TEXTAUSWAHL: Geist und Blick in der graphischen Logik

Eine Folgerung in der graphischen Logik wird dadurch konstruiert, dass der Interpret das sieht und interpretiert, was visuell von beiden gemeinsam erfasst werden kann. Denn das logisch zu erfassende Objekt oder der Gegenstandsbereich ist visuell und syntaktisch als Zeichen gegenwärtig. In den Vorüberlegungen zur 1. Konvention der Logik heißt es deshalb:

»Das Diagramm muss offensichtlich also etwas sein, was wir sehen und über das wir nachdenken können. Nun erscheint das, was wir sehen, als auf einem Blatt ausgedehnt.« (CP 4.430, ca. 1904)

Damit ist die zweidimensionale Fläche als Syntax der EG eingeführt:

Die Syntax und Semantik der Fläche: Das gemeinsam erblickte Zeichen ist zunächst ein leeres Blatt, das Autor und Interpret »im Blick« haben. D.h. dieses Blatt ist jenes gemeinsame Objekt, das zum Bezugspunkt aller weiteren logisch-graphischen Operationen dient: Das unbeschriebene Blatt, auf das Autor und Interpret blicken, begrenzt den visuellen Zeichenbereich, auf den Graphist und Interpret sich einlassen sollen.

Das unbeschriebene Blatt wird durch das einzige Axiom der EG als das syntaktisch erste und semantisch grundlegende visuelle Zeichen der EG eingeführt. Es muß dies das pragmatisch erste Ergebnis des Dialogs zwischen Graphist und Interpret sein. Damit können wir erklären, wie durch dieses erste Axiom die *visuelle Semantik der EG* begründet wird. Eine semantische Interpretation des Blatts geschieht dadurch, dass sich Graphist und Interpret einig sind, dass sich DIESES Blatt HIER, – wobei jede gemeinsam wahrnehmbare eindeutige begrenzte Fläche geeignet ist – als visuelles Symbol auf *denselben* Gegenstandsbereich bezieht.

1. *Quasi-Mind: Wie im Zeichenprozess gemeinsames Wissen und Erfahrung geteilt werden*

1.) Peirce: CP 4.536

I have already noted that a Sign has an Object and an Interpretant, the latter being that which the Sign produces in the Quasi-mind that is the Interpreter by determining the latter to a feeling, to an exertion, or to a Sign, which determination

is the Interpretant. But it remains to point out that there are usually two Objects, and more than two Interpretants. Namely, we have to distinguish the Immediate Object, which is the Object as the Sign itself represents it, and whose Being is thus dependent upon the Representation of it in the Sign, from the Dynamical Object, which is the Reality which by some means contrives to determine the Sign to its Representation. In regard to the Interpretant we have equally to distinguish, in the first place, the Immediate Interpretant, which is the interpretant as it is revealed in the right understanding of the Sign itself, and is ordinarily called the meaning of the sign; while in the second place, we have to take note of the Dynamical Interpretant which is the actual effect which the Sign, as a Sign, really determines. Finally there is what I provisionally term the Final Interpretant, which refers to the manner in which the Sign tends to represent itself to be related to its Object. I confess that my own conception of this third interpretant is not yet quite free from mist. Of the ten divisions of signs which have seemed to me to call for my special study, six turn on the characters of an Interpretant and three on the characters of the Object. Thus the division into Icons, Indices, and Symbols depends upon the different possible relations of a Sign to its Dynamical Object. Only one division is concerned with the nature of the Sign itself, and this I now proceed to state.

(In Dezimalnotation, z.B. 4.536, wird der vierte Band und der 536. Abschnitt der "Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce" zitiert, Bd.I -VI, hrsg. v. Charles Hartshorne und Paul Weiss, Harvard UP, 1931-35; Bd. VII u. VIII, hrsg. v. Arthur W. Burks, Harvard UP, 2.Aufl.: The Belknap Press of Harvard UP, 1958)

2.) Peirce: CP 4.550

All the various meanings of the word "Mind," Logical, Metaphysical, and Psychological, are apt to be confounded more or less, partly because considerable logical acumen is required to distinguish some of them, and because of the lack of

any machinery to support the thought in doing so, partly because they are so many, and partly because (owing to these causes), they are all called by one word, "Mind." In one of the narrowest and most concrete of its logical meanings, a Mind is that Some of The Truth, whose determinations become Immediate Interpretants of all other Signs whose Dynamical Interpretants are dynamically connected. In our Diagram the same thing which represents The Truth must be regarded as in another way representing the Mind, and indeed, as being the Quasi-mind of all the Signs represented on the Diagram. For any set of Signs which are so connected that a complex of two of them can have one interpretant, must be Determinations of one Sign which is a Quasi-mind.

3.) Peirce: CP 4.551

Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; and one can no more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the shapes, etc., of objects are really there. Consistently adhere to that unwarrantable denial, and you will be driven to some form of idealistic nominalism akin to Fichte's. Not only is thought in the organic world, but it develops there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot be thought without Signs. We must here give "Sign" a very wide sense, no doubt, but not too wide a sense to come within our definition. Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it may further be declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs require at least two Quasi-minds; a Quasi-utterer and a Quasi-interpreter; and although these two are at one (i.e., are one mind) in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, welded. Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every logical evolution of thought should be dialogic. You may say that all this is loose talk; and I admit that,

as it stands, it has a large infusion of arbitrariness. It might be filled out with argument so as to remove the greater part of this fault; but in the first place, such an expansion would require a volume -- and an uninviting one; and in the second place, what I have been saying is only to be applied to a slight determination of our system of diagrammatization, which it will only slightly affect; so that, should it be incorrect, the utmost certain effect will be a danger that our system may not represent every variety of non-human thought.

4.) Peirce: CP 4.553

Convention the Second; Of the Matter of the Scripture, and the Modality of the Phemes expressed. The matter which the Graph-instances are to determine, and which thereby becomes the Quasi-mind in which the Graphist and Interpreter are at one, being a Seme of The Truth, that is, of the widest Universe of Reality, and at the same time, a PHEME of all that is tacitly taken for granted between the Graphist and Interpreter, from the outset of their discussion, shall be a sheet, called the Phemic Sheet, upon which signs can be scribed and from which any that are already scribed in any manner (even though they be incised) can be erased.

5.) Peirce: CP 7.669

To state the matter otherwise: An idea, a surmise springs up in my mind. It recommends itself to me more or less forcibly as reasonable. The fact that it recommends itself to me more or less surely warrants its pretty near accord with what will recommend itself to reasonable minds as well as to the quasi-mind behind the issues of the future. That idea acts upon other ideas and absolutely forces me to say that it requires certain things to happen in the future. The future events come to pass and in part negative my surmise, in part confirm it. I do not know what idea we can form of reality except that it is that threefold force; or what the real can be

except that which the whole process tends, as we hope, to induce our thoughts to rest upon.

2. Die Logik und der Blick auf die Zeichnung: Autor (Graphist) und Interpreten (Grapheus) in der Logik der Existential Graphs

1.) Peirce: CP 4.395

Convention No. I. These Conventions are supposed to be mutual understandings between two persons: a Graphist, who expresses propositions according to the system of expression called that of Existential Graphs, and an Interpreter, who interprets those propositions and accepts them without dispute.

2.) Peirce: CP 4.431 Cross-Ref:

431. But what are our assertions to be about? The answer must be that they are to be about an arbitrarily hypothetical universe, a creation of a mind. For it is necessary reasoning alone that we intend to study; and the necessity of such reasoning consists in this, that not only does the conclusion happen to be true of a pre-determinate universe, but will be true, so long as the premisses are true, howsoever the universe may subsequently turn out to be determined. Thus, conformity to an existing, that is, entirely determinate, universe does not make necessity, which consists in what always will be, that is, what is determinately true of a universe not yet entirely determinate. Physical necessity consists in the fact that whatever may happen will conform to a law of nature; and logical necessity, which is what we have here to deal with, consists of something being determinately true of a universe not entirely determinate as to what is true, and thus not existent.

In order to fix our ideas, we may imagine that there are two persons, one of whom, called the grapheus, creates the universe by the continuous development of his idea of it, every interval of time during the process adding some fact to the universe, that is, affording justification for some assertion, although, the process being continuous, these facts are not distinct from one another in their mode of being, as the propositions, which state some of them, are. As fast as this process in the mind of the grapheus takes place, that which is thought acquires being, that is, perfect definiteness, in the sense that the effect of what, is thought in any lapse of time, however short, is definitive and irrevocable; but it is not until the whole operation of creation is complete that the universe acquires existence, that is, entire determinateness, in the sense that nothing remains undecided. The other of the two persons concerned, called the graphist, is occupied during the process of creation in making successive modifications (i.e., not by a continuous process, since each modification, unless it be final, has another that follows next after it), of the entire graph. Remembering that the entire graph is whatever is, at any time, expressed in this system on the sheet of assertion, we may note that before anything has been drawn on the sheet, the blank is, by that definition, a graph. It may be considered as the expression of whatever must be well-understood between the graphist and the interpreter of the graph before the latter can understand what to expect of the graph. *There must be an interpreter, since the graph, like every sign founded on convention, only has the sort of being that it has if it is interpreted; for a conventional sign is neither a mass of ink on a piece of paper or any other individual existence, nor is it an image present to consciousness, but is a special habit or rule of interpretation and consists precisely in the fact that certain sorts of ink spots -- which I call its replicas -- will have certain effects on the conduct, mental and bodily, of the interpreter. So, then, the blank of the blank sheet may be considered as expressing that the universe, in process of creation by the*

grapheus, is perfectly definite and entirely determinate, etc. Hence, even the first writing of a graph on the sheet is a modification of the graph already written. The business of the graphist is supposed to come to an end before the work of creation is accomplished. He is supposed to be a mind-reader to such an extent that he knows some (perhaps all) the creative work of the grapheus so far as it has gone, but not what is to come. What he intends the graph to express concerns the universe as it will be when it comes to exist. If he risks an assertion for which he has no warrant in what the grapheus has yet thought, it may or may not prove true.

3.)

Peirce: CP 4.556

Should the Graphist desire to negative a Graph, he must scribe it on the verso, and then, before delivery to the Interpreter, must make an incision, called a Cut, through the Sheet all the way round the Graph-instance to be denied, and must then turn over the excised piece, so as to expose its rougher surface carrying the negatived Graph-instance. This reversal of the piece is to be conceived to be an inseparable part of the operation of making a Cut. But if the Graph to be negatived includes a Cut, the twice negatived Graph within that Cut must be scribed on the recto, and so forth. The part of the exposed surface that is continuous with the part just outside the Cut is called the Place of the Cut. A Cut is neither a Graph nor a Graph-instance; but the Cut, together with all that it encloses, exposed is termed an Enclosure, and is conceived to be an Instance of a Graph scribed on the Place of the Cut, which is also termed the Place of the Enclosure. The surface within the Cut, continuous with the parts just within it, is termed the Area of the Cut and of the Enclosure; and the part of the recto continuous with the March (i.e., the Phemic Sheet), is likewise termed an Area, namely the Area of the Border. The Copulate of all that is scribed on any one Area, including the Graphs of which the Enclosures

whose Place is this Area are Instances, is called the Entire Graph of that Area; and any part of the Entire Graph, whether graphically connected with or disconnected from the other parts, provided it might be the Entire Graph of the Sheet, is termed a Partial Graph of the Area.